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I. 
1. Social importance of the system of quality protection 
Formulated in the most general manner, the system of quality protection, 
is an institution which — taking into account the situation and possibilities of 
the given economic system — guarantees mainly through economic means 
(acting directly or indirectly) as well as through legal rules (or recommenda-
tions appearing in some legal form) an objective set by the economic policy, 
i. e. to turn out (produce) and put into circulation products suitable for satis-
fying various needs, and to provide such services. This means that to provide 
unobjectionable quality is the very centre of the quality-protection system. In 
economic sense, quality is the totality of the essential and useful properties of 
the product, which renders it suitable for satisfying needs. Consequently the 
basic requirement is that the product should meet any requirements which 
satisfy the purpose of proper use. Formal (legal) criteria promoting judgment 
on these requirements are the following: 
a) the product must meet the quality requirements stipulated by contract; 
b) the product must satisfy the quality requirements specified by official 
regulations (e. g. compulsory standards); 
c) the product must be classified according to regulations. 
The system of quality protection is complex in several respects, and is a 
category that has essential bearing, and acts upon several fields of social acti-
vity, including economic activities first of all. To mention but the most essential 
features of this manifold importance: 
a) The system of quality protection operates with economic and legal 
means alike making use of them in a direct and indirect form. These means 
can be successful only in their interaction, even combined action, hence their 
efficiency has to be studied only on that basis of reciprocity. 
b) As concerns economic activities, the system of quality protection equally 
affects the productive and marketing sphere, as well as the connected economic 
branches. Hence it exerts effect on industrial products and agricultural produce, 
and on the activities turning out these; essentially, it fully embraces the trading 
activity and the trading system, including the field of wholesale and retail 
trade alike. 
c) The system of quality control necessarily influences in essence all econo-
mic units, both in state and cooperative sector. At the same time, this effect 
is felt in most respects primarily by the consumer (including here the producer-
consumer). In the last analysis, reason and purpose of the quality control 
system are embodied in the consumer. 
d) It is exactly because of the comprehensive nature and effect of this 
system that quality protection is of exceptional economic-political and general 
social-political importance. Consequently state intervention in this field — on a 
specified level and in a special extension — is inevitably necessary, not only 
in the proper choice of economic and legal means, but also by employing direct 
state (official) means as need may be and to a periodically changing extent. 
2. Chief components of the quality protection system 
The quality protection system is made up of the following components, 
and/or is embodied in the forms enumerated below: 
(1) Specification of the quality requirements of products. 
a) Specification by the state 
aa) The principal means is specification through standards. Types, forms, 
fields of applications, etc. of standards need not be discussed in particular 
details. The fact, however, of the greatest importance for oursubject-matter is 
that standards are the most general and economically most efficient means of 
quality specification (and quality certification as well); this circumstance has 
its self-evident importance for the legal regulations which concern faulty per-
formance. A fundamental grouping of standards is important for our purpose 
for the same reason. As concerns the level of standardization, there are national 
standards and trade ones. As to the effect of standards, they might be of compul-
sory or permissive character, or standards of recommended nature. As to the 
contents of standards, there is to be distinguished between product standards, 
classification standards and acceptance (testing) standards. 
ab) Further forms of quality requirement specification by the state appear 
as other official orders or central regulations (instructions of ministers, mea-
sures of supervisory bodies, etc.). 
In cases under aa) and ab), quality requirements are prescribed centrally. 
But standardization must at the same time promote not only improvement of 
quality and protection of the consumer, but also the realization of conceptions 
of technical development, the efficiency of production, and the national imp-
lementation of recommendations and decisions accepted in the framework of 
international cooperation. 
b) Specification of quality requirements through the contractual system 
Theoretically, the natural content element of any contract aimed at the 
delivery of a product is an accurate specification of the quality requirements 
of the same. This is of fundamental importance for satisfying the contract-
making interests of the obligee, and also for the enforceability of legal con-
sequences in cases of breach of contract. The pertinent agreement of the parties 
has the same effect as the compulsory specifications in respect of the legal 
effect in the given legal relationship. That specification by the parties is often 
effected by making reference to specification by the state, is another matter. 
Non-compulsory, permissible or recommended stipulations connected with 
quality specification included in the general terms and conditions of delivery 
of products serve to influence the contractual will or to render the same more 
definite. (Terms and conditions of delivery of products are regarded here — 
and will be regarded hereinafter — as forms of regulation having no legal 
force, nevertheless, claiming actually to be generally applied.) 
c) Cases of central price fixing must be interpreted as one kind of the 
governmental means of quality requirement specification. Quality usually plays 
a role in price-fixing. A detailed study of quality requirements connected with 
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the price is beyond the scope of this paper; but a given aspect of this question 
is to be dealt, namely the correlations between claims arising from faulty 
performance and the price of the product, or the possible effects of such 
correlations on the legal regulations. 
(2) Certification of quality 
The basic principles connected with the certification of quality are laid 
down in Resolution No. 43/1967. GB; Decree No. 47/1968. (XII. 18.) Korm., 
containing provisions on the basic questions of quality certification, was issued 
on this basis. This legal rule enumerates the . various main forms of certification 
such as a) the quality certificate, b) the technical specification, c) the quality 
mark, d) certification of quality through data shown on the product, e) certifi-
cation of quality in the consignment note. 
(3) Liability for defective performance; system of sanctions 
a) Amid our economic conditions, it is a basic requirement to shape an 
economic environment in which observance of quality requirements and imp-
rovement of quality is of economic advantage to the economic units concerned, 
and, vice versa, their non-observance involves financial disadvantage over a 
shorter or longer term. In other words, effects are felt in the economic back-
ground which — mainly through the proper determination of incentives, and 
as the objective effect of market conditions — render the producer and distri-
butor of the product actually interested in the observance of the quality 
requirements in the given period and over a longer term. 
b) In addition to the economic factors, and inseparably connected to them, 
legal means sanctioning defective performance are of special importance; for-
mally they differ from the disadvantages mentioned under a) in that they are 
usually attached to a concrete violation of law, a given breach of contract, etc. 
There are trends in recent legislation that the whole of the law-violating 
conduct, its continuous nature and repetition, should entail legal sanctions 
(e. g. economic fine), in addition to those applied because of ad hoc violations 
of the law. 
As concerns legal sanctions, we may distinguish here the following basic 
types: 
— legal sanctions under civil law first of all warranty of specified quality, 
guaranty and compensation of damages 
— other legal sanctions which do not affect the economic unit as a whole 
(as a legal entity) but are of personal nature. 
These are the penal sanctions (Sections 232 to 234 of the Criminal Code), the 
petty offence sanctions (Section 6 of Act I of 1968), the sanctions of labour law 
which involve disciplinary liability in given cases. Economic fines are of special 
importance in the sphere of sanctions for definite reasons already touched 
upon in part. 
(4) Controlling the observance of quality parameters 
Control over the observance of quality parameters is realized basically in 
two fields. 
a) Official control 
Kinds of quality control employed in aa) manufacturing, ab) putting on 
the market (or prior to it), and ac) in the circulation, may be regarded as 
belonging here. 
b) Non-official ways and methods of control 
Essentially, this sphere includes control over the observance of quality 
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parameters and requirements in fields and forms where such control is moti-
vated by direct interests. 
Here belong: ba) first of all internal quality control, quality control 
departments, etc. employed by production units; bb) control (so-called quality 
acceptance control) employed between economic units on the basis of contracts 
or other regulations; be) control employed by economic units on the basis of 
contracts of agency or — in certain cases — prescribed by legal provisions. 
Of the forms of control enumerated under b), those under bb) and be) are 
of special importance for our purpose because these are essential means of 
consumer interest protection. 
Within the sphere of controlling observance of quality requirements, we 
have intentionally not spoken here of control of the product by the consumer, 
i. e. of the examination obligation of the buyer, user, etc. Apart from the fact 
that such examination has substantially nothing in common with the foregoing 
enumeration, from a legal point of view our most important reason therefore 
is the fact that, although examination by the consumer is an interest deserving 
appreciation by the legal system it will, however, appear from the legal 
construction to be presented fur ther in detail that failure to carry out such 
examination is not qualified as neglect of duty. 
(5) Means influencing efficiency of the quality control system in indirect ways 
Amid the circumstances of our economic system, these are to be unders-
tood as means of greatly increasing importance which are in the closest cor-
relation with indirect market-influencing activities. 
These are: a) the system of distinctive classification of products, b) the 
informative labelling system, c) setting up showrooms, arranging displays, 
d) t rade marks, labels, copyright in design, e) quality marks (we mention the 
latter despite the fact that the respective legal rules have been annulled). Or, 
more exactly, what has been anulled is Decree No. 121/1950 (IV. 25) MT, but 
quality mark protection still exists under special legal provisions in respect of 
certain goods. 
3. Some questions of economic policy connected with the quality 
protection system 
(1) It is a commonly known view that economic policy forms part of the 
general policy of any state and is concerned with the principal aims of econo-
mic development and the means serving the realization thereof. Determinants 
of economic policy are — in addition to long-term target — the economic 
situation, internal and external circumstances of economic activity, the interests 
and the will of society, of the working masses. 
From the foregoing conclusion, the following must be pointed out for the 
purpose of our theme: 
a) One determinant of economic policy is the economic situation. The 
targets of economic policy act towards improving the „economic environment" 
through aiming at a better exploitation and increased use of given potentials 
in order to realize the optimal economic system. 
b) One principal target of economic policy is a substantial improvement 
of the living standards of the working population, and this is closely correlated 
with the protection of consumer interests. 
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The new economic system introduced in Hungary on January 1, 1968, 
brought substantial changes partly as concerns the targets of economic policy, 
but mainly in respect of means and ways. For the purpose of our theme, the 
most important characteristics of the former system were: 
a) Centrally issued plan instructions determined the production of indust-
rial units basically; this meant not only a compulsory determination of the 
quantities to be manufactured, of the materials to be used, etc., but.— in view 
of quality specifications, — also of assortments in many cases. 
b) The user units — which were determined, too — were usually under ' 
the legal obligation to take over the product from the producer even if the 
quality was defective. In absence of such legal obligation, the same situation 
was the result of economic necessity. 
c) The price system was fixed, and thus it was theoretically presumed that 
the quality of products was kept on unchanged standards. 
d) Market commodity conditions were pushed in the background, the 
market had practically no effect on improving quality standards. 
e) Owing to the circumstances mentioned, enterprises were hardly inte-
rested economically in improving the standards of products. 
f) The cogency of legal regulation was a regulatory system characteristic 
of nearly all fields of the quality protection system, and the role of parties in 
shaping the contents of contracts was practically negligible. Official interven-
tion by state organs for the sake of quality protection was of an extremely 
wide range and direct as concerns forms. 
g) The regulatory system was fundamentally based on holding out the 
prospect of sanctionable requirements and hardly applied the granting of 
favours for the production and marketing of products of better quality. 
The foregoing were intended only to present some general characteristics, 
or just to give an idea of them; the differences resulting from the principles 
of the former and the new system are to be exposed while discussing the details. 
(2) It's easy to see from all this why numerous legal provisions framed in 
the former economic environment have been set aside. It is a commonly known 
fact, however, that quite a number of legal provisions — and not unimportant 
ones as a matter of fact — framed in the past era are still valid in an 
unchanged or amended form. 
Provisions of law — correct in their principal conception — are opposed 
in respect of certain not unessential details to the economic-political targets 
of the new system; others need modernization for considerations of a new 
legal practice, possibly of legal dogmatics. This is the case particularly as to< 
the Civil Code, especially its part dealing with faulty performance. Finally, an 
evaluating revision of the valid legal material is required to place the new 
and amended provisions of law issued meanwhile on a consolidated basis in 
order to vindicate consistently the demands of the new economic system. The 
most important points of view for asserting targets of economic policy in legal 
regulation are contained in the following statements of Decision no. 43/1967 GB: 
a) Through increasing the number of indirect economic incentives, and 
through enhancing their efficiency, an economic environment shall be created 
in which the quality of the product ensured by the interest of enterprises. To 
activate an attitude of taking into account enterprisal interests over a longer 
range (for a longer period of time), is of particular importance. 
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b) The principle shall be asserted, even more pre'.isely realized, that 
economic units assume responsibility for their functional activity in a wider 
sphere than the actual one. In other words, enterprises shall be responsible for 
their productive activity, and those putting products in circulation shall be 
responsible for organizing their trading activity efficiently. Hence the producer 
shall be responsible for making products of good quality, the one putting them 
in circulation for circulating such good products well. The Decision of the 
Economic Comission (GB) mentioned above reflects the producer's direct and 
stringent responsibility for the quality of products clearly. 
c) A natural concomitant implication of the new economic system is to 
replace direct, central intervention by the state by the enforcement of economic 
incentives. At the same time, with regard to general social interests connected 
with quality protection, intervention of state agencies though official means 
might remain justified in specified spheres, moreover their intensification 
might be advisable in given cases. 
d) A question connected with the former, though independent, is to make 
the system of responsibility more rigorous in the sphere of regulation by the 
state, to modernize sanctionable facts in specified cases mainly through an 
uniformly principled and at the same time differentiated regulation of warranty 
and guaranty, and further, to expand the application sphere of sanctions 
known at present (e. g. economic fine). 
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II. 
1. Cases belonging to the sphere of faulty performance qualified 
as breach of contract 
For the purposes of the research in civil law problems of the quality 
protection system, it is primary importance to delimit the sphere of cases 
which may be regarded as faulty performance, or, in terms of law, to determine 
the cases which materialize breach of contract to be qualified as faulty per-
formance. As regards actual Hungarian law, the starting-point is constituted 
first of all by Chapter XXV of the Civil Code which contains the provisions 
relating to faulty performance (Sections 305 to 308) under the title „Breach of 
Contract" in a special subtitle. Connected with this are the further rules which 
are normative for faulty performance in the sphere of common regulations on 
breach of contract (Sections 314 to 318), as well as certain further rules in the 
general and special parts of the Civil Code dealing with contracts. 
(1) The Civil Code gives no general definitions in the conceptual description 
of faulty performance: it follows the codification principle — employed in 
the entire Code consistently — that the definition of legal concepts is not a 
task in the drafting of laws. 
Notwithstanding this, regulations as a whole expresses — in respect to the 
sphere of principal cases at least — adequately those kinds of breach of 
contract to which the rules of faulty performance must be applied. As the 
basic case, the law pays regard to the delivery of things and extends this 
logically to cases where the obligation is not aimed at the delivery of a thing 
(Civil Code Section 308). Consequently, this means from the outset a delimita-
tion from what is called the warranty of right, and besides there is a difference 
— in a specially regulated way — for the case of faulty delivery of animals in 
the sphere of delivery of things (warranty in case of selling animals, Civil Code 
Sections 383—385). Various special provisions of law differ from the rules of 
the Civil Code in defining the sphere of faulty performance only in respect of 
details or certain approaches; from this point of view, there is no essential 
departure in principle, at least as concerns the principal questions. 
Delimitation of faulty performance is necessary both as concerns legislation 
and enforcement of law, and must be based, as a matter of course, on generally 
accepted maxima of legal dogmatics. 
Such delimitation is possible in several respects, we employ mainly two of 
these. The grouping to be presented first pays attention basically to legislative 
requirements, and comprises accordingly, and essentially, cases belonging to, 
or to be drawn into, the sphere of faulty performance (under A). The grouping 
to be discussed secondly takes into account rather the needs of legal practice, 
and is based on the formal-objective criteria of the presence or ascertainability 
of a defect (under B). It goes without saying that practically all important 
cases are included in both groupings alike, if only by different approaches. 
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A.) (1) Defective delivery owing to lack or defect of properties ensuring 
proper use, or prescribed, or otherwise required (defective delivery defective 
as to quality or properties taken in the most general sense and handled as 
basic case). 
(2) Insufficient quantity (e. g. there are fewer dice in the box). 
(3) So-called aliud delivery, when delivery in itself is faultless, but — in 
view of the contractual causa (intention) — does not fulfil the same (e. g. a 
camera making black-and-white photographs instead of being able to make 
colour ones). 
(4) Breach of administrative obligations certifying quality, ensuring quality 
protection, or better usability of the product (failure to present a quality 
certificate, instructions for handling and use, etc., or defects of these). 
(5) So-called incomplete delivery (lack of an essential part indispensable 
to fulfil the proper contractual intention in case of indivisible delivery). 
Today legal literature and legal practice includes 1. and 2. in the sphere 
of faulty performance unequivocally; the situation is essentially the same in 
respect of sphere 3. too (although there are instances in certain marginal 
cases of regarding this as ,,non-performance"); practice is uncertain in cases 
coming under 4.; nor is judgement unequivocal in respect of 5. (Foreign laws 
handle this as faulty performance, while the decision of the Central Court of 
Arbitration No. KDB 338. EH regards the same in respect of penalty as default.) 
b) The second grouping resulting from the delimitation of faulty perfor-
mance, and taking into account requirements of law-enforcement, starts from 
the formal-objective possibilities of the factual ascertainment of fault ; the 
latter is regarded as the defect of the thing — and performance is included in 
the sphere of faulty performance accordingly — if delivery (delivery of a thing 
first of all) does not meet the quality, requirements and properties specified 
by a) provision of law. b) other compulsory prescription, instruction, especially 
a standard, including prescriptions which are of compulsory effect not formally, 
but actually; c) the agreement of the parties when entering into the contract; 
d) the fact that such quality etc. is otherwise necessary (even without compul-
sory prescription or contractual agreement) for the proper use of the thing, or 
for its use for a definite length of time. 
The -basic point of view for delimitation in this grouping is the lack of the 
so-called statuatory and/or stipulated properties. Contrary to certain opposite 
views, it is further necessary to emphasize this distinction and duality for the 
purpose of future legislation. since replacement of compulsory prescriptions 
by contractual stipulations is a tendency asserting itself in a widening sphere. 
It must be recognized invariably, too, that the sphere of statutory properties 
includes not only requirements defined by law, but also properties of quality 
which are necessary for the proper use of a thing according to public opinion 
accepted by society. Moreover, owing to the increased demands of the consumer 
as to quality, statuatory properties taken in the former sense are of increased 
importance; this is expressed by the first situation of paragraph d); the second 
situation in d) on the other hand hints at the problem — to be discussed in 
detail in the following — that a requirement to be met by the product is 
usability for a definite length of time, even without special rules or specifica-
tions, hence usability for a definite length of time is not only a „guaranty" 
requirement, but also a requirement of „warranty". That its degree and extent 
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may depend in given cases on certain factors, e. g. the price of the product 
in our opinion, is another question. 
C) Taking as the basis the degree of the defect may be a fur ther criterion 
arising from considerations of law enforcement and law-making for the delimi-
nation of faulty performance. Both the Civil Code and the statuatory provision 
on contracts of product-supply use the distinction between „unfit" and „pro-
perty-deficient" delivery. This distinction will be needed — in our view — in 
the future, too, and the consequences resulting from it must also be asserted 
through legislation; moreover, we might say vice versa that this distinction 
is made justified by the very requirements of law-making. Yet as concerns the 
„conceptual" definition of faulty performance, the degree of the defect is not 
a matter of principle, and is therefore of no decisive importance; it might be 
taken into account for working out details, similarly to differentiation possibly 
made on the basis of apparent and hidden defects. 
2. Questions of the legal basis of responsibility for faulty performance; 
relief of such, responsibility. 
(1) Most legal systems regard guaranty and warranty as belonging to the 
system of responsibility under civil law being an intensified, highly rigorous 
form of objective responsitiblity independent of imputability; this is expressed 
even more impressively when „almost unconditional" responsibility is mentioned 
in such cases. The latter formulation indicates that the possibility of being 
relieved of such responsibility is rather limited, is practically exceptional, 
particularly in cases of guaranty. For the sake of accuracy we must mention 
here that what has been said above applies to the „classical" (traditional) 
claims arising form faulty performance; true, responsibility for expenses 
connected with faulty performance has an objective basis as a rule, but as 
concerns responsibility for damages resulting therefrom this is often based on 
imputability. In view of this, we shall in the following examine the questions 
of the legal basis of responsibility for warranty and guaranty as projected on 
traditional warranty (guaranty) claims; questions of bearing expenses and com-
pensation for damages will be dealt with in another context. 
(2) As concerns relief, the Civil Code contains the following precepts: 
In respect of warranty, paragraph (4) of Section 305 provides that the 
obligor shall be relieved of warranty if the obliges was aware of the defect 
when entering into the contract; 
in respect of guaranty, Section 248 provides that the person undertaking 
guaranty shall be relieved thereof only if he can prove that the cause of the 
fault did not originate until after tradition had been effected. 
These two rules contain the cause resulting in relief from two different 
approaches; and, as regards the real situation, neither of them seems to be 
complete. 
It is obvious also on the basis of the Civil Code (and the ministerial moti-
vation to the Bill refers thereto) that since delivery must be faultless upon 
tradition — as follows from the nature of warranty —, the obligor is not 
responsible for defects arising subsequently, similarly to the rule in Section 
248 on relief of obligations under guaranty. And as to the other „reason for 
relief", it seems probable that — in connection with relief of responsibility — 
the Civile Code makes express reference to defects known at the time of 
contract-making because it wished to emphasize a difference, substantial in 
comparison to former law; namely that there shall be a responsibility of war-
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ranty in the future in respect of defects even when they could have been 
ascertained by the obligee when making the contract. 
In respect of guaranty, the laconic wording followed from the then do-
minating view that — the guaranty being a kind of responsibility undertaken 
by agreement — any fur ther question relating to the legal basis of respon-
sibility must be settled by the parties contractually. 
Finally, in connection with this theme, we must quote Section 316 of the 
Civil Code, belonging to the common rules on breach of contract: „Where the 
obligee accepts performance being aware of the breach, such obligee may 
thereafter raise claims resulting from breach of contract only if he has reserved 
for himself the right thereto. This rule shall not apply to contracts of socialist 
organizations inter se." 
(3) As concerns relief at responsibility for faulty performance, there a re 
consequently two phases of the contractual relation which are of equal im-
portance, but must be evaluated separately: one is the coming into existence 
of the contract, the other is the performance thereof (and the subsequent 
period, respectively). For the sake of simpleness, let us first discuss the 
latter theme. 
The distinction which determines the essence of warranty as reflected upon 
the actual state of the delivered thing at tradition, while it determines guaranty 
reflected on the full duration of use, is nowadays usually regarded as obsolete. 
In both cases, the requirement is the faultlessness of the product, at tradition, 
in such sense that it must 'not have any deficiency — left hidden, or „latent" — 
which, as a source of defect, results in a breakdown, or leads to the emergence 
of some defect, later on. Consequently, according to our present views, the 
wording of guaranty in the Civil Code fully and correctly covers the case of 
warranty, too. 
In this sense, therefore, both cases of responsibility for faulty performance 
mean that the obligor commits breach of contract if the cause of the defect 
was inherent in the thing upon tradition, irrespective of the chronological 
emergence of the consequences thereof. On the other hand, it follows f rom 
this logically that if it is a case of breakdown resulting from a cause sub-
sequent to tradition, this is, in essence, not a case of „relief responsibility" 
neither, more exactly, of „relieving oneself" thereof. The fact is that no breach 
of contract has actually been committed, the conduct of the obligor was not 
unlawful; thus, the primary condition of setting the mechanism of responsi-
bility into motion is not present, let alone the fact that even the lack of causal 
nexus could be called upon which would neutralize any investigation into 
unlawfulness. 
(4) Relatively more doubtful questions arise in connection with defects 
known at the time of contract-making, at the time of performance, or, more 
accurately, at the time of acceptance. The difficulty arises mainly from the 
circumstance that the state at contract-making often coincides with the date 
of performance; in such a case the two phases can be separated only dogma-
tically, nor even so in certain cases. This is especially the case with mass 
pruchases in trade, which we have chosen as our basic model. 
In cases where the making of the contract does not coincide with perfor-
mance, the problem can be reduced; the quoted rule of the Civil Code actually 
relates to such cases. It is not the difference in time which renders the separa-
tion of the two phases important; it may happen that the making of the 
contract is followed by performance immediately in such cases, too. What is of 
importance here is the circumstance that there is a clearly delimitable nego-
tiation of contract-making between the parties which extended, among others, 
to the qualitative specification of the product. If, as a result of such negotiation, 
agreement is reached on the part of the obligee for a product of known defect, 
responsibility under warranty may not be called upon, not as the obligee 
actually wished to purchase such product; there exists — projected on the 
causa of contract — no „fault" on the part of the obligor; breach of contract, 
„faulty" performance are out of question. Consequently, in that sense there is 
no „relief of responsibility", in the mentioned case, but it is the unlawfulness, 
the fundamental element of breach of contract what fails. 
(5) In respect of legal valuation, fur ther problems arise when the thing 
delivered has some defect that can be ascertained at acceptance, or if you like, 
when such defect is quite conspicuous; anyway, when the defect is of such 
nature as can be ascertained even by the non-expert buyer beyond any doubt, 
and be perceived immediately. It must be stuned most emphatically that the 
legal questions to be discussed now will be discussed in connection with defects 
taken in this sense. We shall discuss only defects where it is not only the cause 
of the defect that exists upon acceptance, but where the fact of faultiness is 
already given; we may speak about the „ascertainability" of the defect in the 
sense of a circumstance which may be, and/or is, perceived by the obligee 
objectively and „prima vista". The question is this: what significance do the 
defects have in respect of responsibility under warranty (guaranty), or, more 
exactly in respect of relief of responsibility, if they exist already upon accep-
tance and can be recognized without taking any further measures and making 
any investigation, i. e. they are given defects. 
To narrow down the sphere of defects to fully obvious defects, is necessary 
for two reasons, at least for the sake of the construction we shall follow 
hereinafter. First of all because of the fact that — based on practical considera-
tions — the provision of the Civil Code [paragraph (1) of Section 283] pre-
serving examination by the obligee as his legal obligation is to be dismissed. 
True, this rule is seemingly justified and in accord with the cooperation 
principle binding the parties; but, in reality, it is provision which provokes 
perhaps the largest number of problems, difficulties and legal disputes in the 
sphere of faulty performance. The obligation to examine can be prescribed by 
provision of law as a matter of course; but legal rules in most cases cannot 
approach its ways, and especially its duration, but through references and 
circumscriptions. This situation prevails especially in cases of purchase on the 
mass basis, i. e. usually in respect of the obligee of the model we are discussing. 
It is a commonly known fact, too, that the consumer-buyer does not have the 
knowledge, nor the possibly necessary means, to examine the article in such 
manner that could be regarded as competent and essential. But the problem 
becomes acute legally in that sense that if examination is prescribed as an 
obligation under the law, the same law has to sanction its non-observance. 
And in the sphere of faulty performance, any such sanction becomes auto-
matically extremely severe: it might affect the enforceability of claims arising 
from faulty performance. Obligation to examine determines, or at least affects, 
the starting-date of the enforceability of the warranty claim. The Civil Code 
follows this solution, and it was exactly the difficulties arising from this that 
judicial practice was not able to overcome;-and XXXI. PED (Civil Law Prin-
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cipled Decision of the Supreme Court) tried to solve the problem by resolving 
the duration of examination completely whereby the obligation of examination 
itself was, in essence, rendered problematical. We must reach this conclusion 
also if we take into account the reasons given for this principled decision: 
. . examination of the thing delivered is to decisive importance. . ." Also the 
following place is formally conform with the sense of the law: the t ime 
required for examination „shall be determined by taking into account the type 
and nature of delivery as well as all circumstances". Thus the principled 
decision — quite understandably — tries to bring itself in its wording in 
conformity with the examination system of the Civil Code: but as mentioned 
loosening of the duration of examination — otherwise necessary for practical 
reasons — has, in the last analysis, degraded the sense and the legal importance 
of the obligation to examine. 
We are of the opinion that examination as a legal obligation must be 
discontinued, and that the resulting conclusions must be drawn in fu tu re legis-
lation. From this standpoint our view to regard the regulative distinction 
between apparent defect — taken in the traditional sense — and latent defect 
as unnecessary, resp. obsolete seems quite consistent. 
It is exactly for eliminating any undesirable comparison or confusion wi th 
„apparent defects" that we deem it necessary to speak of evident defects in 
the sphere of cases mentioned. This terminological difference indicates that — 
as opposed to „apparent defects in the sphere of cases mentioned. This termi-
nological difference indicates that — as opposed to "apparent defects" — 
evident defects mean deficiencies which can be appraised, seen, etc. at once 
without any examination whatsoever. 
It may be termed as striking that our present, statutory rules in force 
contain no provisions — not express ones at least — on the discussed question. 
This may probably be explained by the fact that this problem was considered 
solvable on the basis of, or by comparison with, the provision on the defects 
known at the time of contract-making, with due regard to the frequent coin-
cidence of the date of contract-making and the date of performance. In the 
sphere of guaranty again — covering in typical cases new products — this 
problem has been thought to be of almost negligible importance. 
(6) In connection with the problem discussed, it is justified to raise the 
question of the seller's information obligation, and of the pertinent expectations. 
As known there were in the past certain requirements — thought-provoking 
as to their foundation, but to be regarded as exaggerated in their practical 
effects nevertheless — which made it the duty of the seller merchant, etc. to-
call the buyer's attention to the defects, deficiencies of the product expressly. 
It seems quite natural even today — and this demand increases as the 
standards of civilized trade improve — that the seller should inform the buyer 
about the essential properties, features, etc, of the thing adequately, including 
circumstances that affect or perhaps hinder, proper use. But it is obviously 
not to be expected from the seller to overemphasize defects and to dissuade 
thereby, so to say, the seller from purchasing. As to our present theme, this 
question is of relative importance, since there are defects which the buyer can 
perceive directly without any special warning or information. In case of such, 
defects, there is no need for any particular information on the part of the 
seller. Moreover, if he would be required to do so, this might eventually lead 
to a situation in which the seller would perhaps present some defect as more 
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important than it is in order to deprive the buyer from the outset of the possi-
bility to raise a warranty claim later on. 
Trading attitude and the pertinent expectations are judged differently in 
respect of physical, etc. non-evident deficiencies, i. e. in respect of defects of 
which the seller is aware, which affect proper use, but become manifest in 
their effects only later on. Legal evaluation of such attitude is closely correlated 
with the legal effects of quality certifications, instructions for handling for 
use, etc. 
Hence the obligor (seller, etc.) is under no warranty responsibility in res-
pect of defects which are evident at acceptance; no warranty or guaranty claim 
can be based on such defects. But we would regard it proper to complete this 
rule with a further provision: if an evident defect proved to be substantially 
more serious in its effects than could have been reasonably reckoned with by 
the buyer on the basis of what he learned upon acceptance, the responsibility 
of the seller should materialize;, as concerns the circumstance mentioned, the 
burden of proof is entirely with the buyer. Such a supplementary provision 
ought to be regarded as justified, if only because of the circumstance that if 
the validity of warranty is recognized — perhaps to a limited degree — in case 
of used articles, etc. bought at reduced price, a rather limited scope of warranty 
is likewise to be recognized in the discussed case of defects evident at accep-
tance when the buyer pays the full price. 
Another exception may be constituted by the case when the seller has 
undertaken contractual responsibility also in respect of defects evident at ac-
ceptance. This may be of practical importance in foreign trade transactions or 
in connection with undertaking warranty; but, owing to the permissive nature 
of warranty rules, no special provision is necessary here. 
From what has been explained in the foregoing we may draw the conclu-
sion that, as concerns the legal basis of responsibility, we see no noteworthy 
difference between warranty and guaranty. But there are several circumstances 
which separate warranty and guaranty from each other characteristically, and, 
in view of these, we consider it necessary to maintain these two institutions 
parallel in future regulation, too. 
The warranty claims (rights) 
Pursuant to the Civil Code, the generally enforceable warranty claims are: 
a) in case of delivery of an individually specified thing 
— repair 
— or reduction of price, 
— withdrawal only if the thing is unfit for proper use at the time of 
tradition, cannot be repaired appropriately, or repair would take to 
much time, or the obligor does not undertake repair [Civil Code, pa-
ragraph (1) a) and b) of Section 305]. 
b) In case of delivery of goods specified in kind and quantity: — substi-
tution, or repair, or reduction of price, but the obligor may, instead of repair 
or price reduction, substitute the goods, provided such substitution is practi-
cable without such delay as would entitle the obliges to withdrawal (Civil 
Code Section 300). 
— Substitution if the conditions prevail which would entitle to withdrawal 
in the case of delivery of an individually specified thing. 
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— Withdrawal, only if the obligee can prove loss of interest in addition 
to the prevalence of these conditions [Civil Code, paragraph (1) c) and 
d), Section 305]. 
Where the obligor does not undertake, or does not carry out repair of the 
thing within reasonable time, the obligee may repair the defect, or have it 
repaired by somebody else, at the expense of the obligor. [Civil Code paragraph 
(2) of Section 305.] 
Correlation of the nature of the delivered things (individually or in 
kind defined) and the degree of defect (unfit-property-deficient) with 
warranty claims. 
An important preliminary question of regulation relating to the settlement 
of warranty claims is whether such regulation contains a distinction between 
things to be delivered/defined individually or in-kind, fur ther between unfit 
and property-deficient deliveries. Inclusion of these categories in codification 
affects the enforcement of warranty claims considerably. 
A) The distinction between individual and in-kind nature consistently 
pervades the quality-warranty system of the Civil Code. This originates pre-
sumably from the recognition of the actual situation that the individual nature 
of the things delivered (at least in the original legal sense of the term) renders 
the raising of certain claims — especially to substitution — matterless from 
the outset, while the sphere of claims to be considered is wider in the case of 
performance of performance defined in kind. The dogmatic validity of this 
recognition is unquestionable; it may therefore be somewhat striking that the 
distinction in the Civil Code has given rise to sharp criticism for quite a time 
from the practical side (by this we mean now not solely legal practice). 
From opinions voiced in the legal periodicals, it is commonly known today 
that this problem actually arises from the relationship between individual and 
in-kind nature as a distinction in respect to contractual performance, and 
fungible and non-fungible things as a grouping of things. In commercial and 
legal practice, these difficulties culminate in cases where the buyer — especially 
in cases of commercial purchase in shops — selects (separates) one of the 
fungible things, which becomes the subject-matter of individual delivery in the 
legal sense through the act of selection (separation), and thus the delivery itself 
becomes individual. 
And if we take the legal dogmatic principles in their strict sense, the 
astounding consequence following from all this is that those shopping in com-
mercial mass turnover have actually no possibility (or could not have it) for the 
substitution of defective products in the great majority of cases. The absurdity 
of this situation is illustrated well by the example according to which if some-
body selects a thing in a shop, he has lost his claim to substitution thereby; 
while if he orders it per telephone, the claim for substitution persists because 
it was not the buyer who selected the thing. Thus it is a clear-cut demand that 
this anomaly must be ended or resolved by new legislation. 
Possibilities of solution: 
a) The most radical suggestion is to delete any distinction between indivi-
dual and in-kind delivery, at least in the sphere of faulty performance. We 
agree with this by no means. We do not agree because in certain cases it is of 
importance, both for practical interests and legal regulation, whether delivery 
is actually of individual nature. (The question is of special significance in the 
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sphere of legal relations connected with contracts for work; but these questions 
are outside the scope of our studies.) The individual nature of delivery is of 
importance in cases where it is actually the intention of the buyer to obtain 
the selected product, where the causa of transaction is aimed expressly at the 
selected, separated product. 
b) The question must, and can be, solved in another way and in a fairly 
obvious manner. As a matter of fact, what is needed here is nothing else but 
a certain loosening of the rigid, dogmatic view on separation in the relation-
ship of individual and in-kind delivery taking into account instead whether 
the object of delivery is a fungible thing or a non-fungible thing. 
B) The distinction between property-deficient and unfit deliveries is a 
basis of grouping which appears consistently in the Civil Code regulation; it 
leads to the differentiation of property-warranty claims by taking into account 
the degree of defect. As known, this is asserted in the regulation on contracts 
for product-supply in such a way that unfitness ensures a certain claim (subs-
titution) which is not ensured primarily to the customer in case of ,,not unfit" 
deliveries [Paragraph (1) a) of Section 4 of the Guaranty Decree, too, ascribes 
importance to unfitness likewise in such a sense that it is one of the cases 
where substitution may take place instead of repair]. 
The departure of the Civil Code from the decrees mentioned above actually 
follows from the difference in the starting-point, namely that the Civil Code 
recognizes in priciple no hierarchy of warranty claims, while it is characteris-
tically applied in the aforesaid provisions of law. On the other hand, the Civil 
Code takes into account realistic circumstances: the difference between pro-
perty deficiency and unfitness is an objective fact, and legal regulation cannot 
avoid taking into account its consequences. If the thing delivered is in fact 
altogether unfit, it usually makes no sense to speak of repair claims (one 
criterion of unfitness is exactly the fact that the thing cannot be repaired 
properly); to make substitution primary in such cases is an inevitable con-
sequence resulting from external — or we might as well say: physical — 
causes. But this does not entail in the Civil Code system that substitution 
should be restricted from the outset to the sphere of unfit deliveries — and it 
is here that we find a considerable difference compared with social rules. 
Hence we are of the opinion that the distinction between property-deficient 
and unfit deliveries must be maintained in respect of warranty claims, since 
this difference becomes actually manifest even if legal regulation tries to. 
disregard it. Otherwise legal regulation must pay attention to the circumstance 
that unfitness results not only from the fact that the thing is lacking the 
necessary physical properties, quality requirements, etc. to a degree that 
excludes proper use from the outset; if repair is possible in principle, but 
there is no hope for its realization, or this would involve disproportionate 
disadvantages to the obligee (repair taking long time, etc.), this situation must 
also be regarded as such a case. 
For the sake of completeness we must mention that, as concerns the actual 
enforcement of warrenty claims, the physical determinants, properties, etc. of 
the object of delivery have also a realistic and natural effect. As is commonly 
known, repair is out of the question in case of certain products and com-
modities, exactly because of the nature of goods (food, highly perishable pro-
duce, etc.). That special rules apply to such products even now, is connected 
with this fact. 
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Types of warranty claims 
(1) a) Generally enforceable warranty claims under present regulation are: 
substitution, repair, and proportionate reduction of the purchase price. Under 
the simultaneous influence of the so-called trading and producing views the 
Civil Code places warranty claims on one level, and — apart from certain 
exceptions — leaves the right of choice to the obligee. But the type of delivery 
and/or the degree of defect selects for „physical reasons" the range of reali-
zation of certain claims. 
b) The case of withdrawal is a secondary claim in the system of the Civil 
Code (in terms of guaranty: returning of the product and repayment of the 
value, „compensation"). It resembles the claims enumerated in paragraph a) 
in that this, too, is an independent (not accessorial) claim. On the other hand, 
it is secondary as a result of being bound to statuatory conditions: pursuant 
to the Civil Code, the obligee may have resort to withdrawal only in specified 
cases. 
c) The demand for having a thing repaired is a warranty claim which is 
not independent and is conditional at the same time. Pursuant to the Civil 
Code, it is a surrogate of repair, and can be applied only in cases defined 
by law. 
d) The claim for expenses to be borne by the obligor for, or in connection 
with, removal of the defect under warranty (repair, transport, forwarding, 
assemblage, etc. expenses), as well as the claim for damages in connection with 
faulty performance, are not independent claims, they are necessarily accessorial. 
The Civil Code contains express provisions on the bearing of expenses, and on 
compensation, in the part dealing with faulty performance; moreover, as 
concerns compensation, it contains solutions that differ from the general rules 
of responsibility. It ought to be noted that, mainly owing to the accessorial 
nature, these claims are usually not grouped with warranty claims. In our 
opinion there is no doubt that up-to-date legislation should at least regard the 
obligation to bear expenses, and — to a definite degree — also compensation 
as warranty claims. 
(2) We have mentioned before that the sphere of application of the so-
called ordinary warranty claims is determined partly by the nature of delivery, 
partly by the degree of the defect, and that certain claims are realized equally 
and alternatively: Further, it is essential that the right of choise is with the 
obligee, and is restricted only in that the obligor can frustrate enforcement of 
the claim chosen by the obligee through substituting the defective thing by a 
faultless thing. 
In the sphere of warranty claims, it is exactly this right of choice due to 
the obligee, which — at least in its complete form exercised today — has 
become the subject of rather widespread criticisms. The suggestions for a change 
demand that a certain hierarchy should be observed also in Civil Code regu-
lations in the future (as already known with other statutory provisions), and 
mainly in such a way that repair should be possible only secondarily (usually 
if repair is unsuccessful). Those arguing for this solution refer to the fact that 
substitution often means a disproportionate economic disadvantage to the 
obligor; also public opinion holds that it is unfounded to demand substition 
in cases of minor defects which can be repaired simply and promptly. Refe-
rence is often made to what is called consumers' abuses. Finally, reference is 
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also made to guaranty where the consumer regards it as natural that substitu-
tion should be made conditional on reparability. 
The advocates of the ideas presented above think to realize them in the 
following ways: 
a) According to the most extreme standpoint, one must start also in the 
sphere of warranty from the principle that the basic claim is the right to 
repair; it can be exercised as long as the possibility of repair exists (with a 
certain limitation of the number of repairs). By and large, this would mean 
transfer of the guaranty construction to the sphere of property warranty. 
b) In cases where the thing only has a minor defect, the claim should 
extend only to repair and should not include the possibility of immediate sub-
stitution. 
c) According to others, settlement of this question should be made depen-
dent on the price of the product. 
Ad. a) We do not regard this suggestion for solution as not acceptable. 
It would be an extremely bad step backwards to the disadvantage of the 
consumer at a time when the consolidation of consumer protection is an objec-
tive of economic policy. And the rule that the undertaking of guaranty has no 
bearing on statutory warranty claims would become worthless at the same time. 
Ad. b) It admits of no doubt that economic considerations speak for making 
the attempt at repair primary, quasi the starting-point of regulation, in case 
of minor defects or defects that can usually be repaired easily and promptly. 
But it is equally true that, according to public opinion, a thing repaired to any 
degree is no longer a new thing; repair degrades the buyer's subjective 
appraisal of the thing, may affect aesthetical and similar demands. But even 
so, we regard utilization of this idea as conceivable and realizable within 
definite limits. 
Ad. c) To make the solution conditional solely on the price of the product 
is actually a reflection of the view which regards also warranty as a mer-
chandize in the sense that warranty is xoider in case of a more expensive good, 
while ensuring to the buyer claims restricted to a narrower sphere in the case 
of cheaper ones. A „mechanical" assertion of this principle can hardly be 
accepted; in respect of cheaper products, it would mean a general restriction 
of the buyer's, the consumer's rights. It is opposed to the exigencies of econo-
mic policy, and is contrary also to the legal-dogmatic sense of warranty. Ne-
vertheless, this idea has a utilizable element taken into account on our sug-
gestion for solution, to be presented in the following. 
We believe that the idea raised above could be realized in legislation as a 
combination of the conditions mentioned in paragraphs b) and c). This would 
mean that the degree of the defect and a certain value limit combined could 
result in laying down a certain hierarchy of warranty claims. But to take as 
the basis of regulation these points in themselves and separately would be 
wrong in any case. 
What would be wrong first of all is to pay regard solely to the degree of 
the defect, and to give always priority to repair in case of minor defects, i. e. 
to make the possibility of substitution always conditional on repairability. 
Namely it is absolutely justified to expect in case of a thing of higher value 
that it should not have even a reparable defect. An expensive product has the 
effect to arouse maximum confidence in the buyer; this subjective appraisal 
always exerts some influence, and may result even in the repair of a more 
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expensive product, and this we accept whatever the reason be. Otherwise this 
principle must be accepted logically also by those standing on the "more 
expensive thing — more rights" basis. It is only in this way that they can 
voice the ..cheaper thing — smaller rights" thesis which they deem to be 
justified economically. 
Similarly, an approach which would place the differentiation of warranty 
claims solely on the basis of whether the price of the product is below or above 
a certain price limit, can have no absolute validity. As we have said, a lower price 
in itself cannot have the effect of release from responsibility; products of 
lower price, too, must be suitable for satisfying a given need, and the obli-
gation of warranty embraces such products as a matter of course. Any release 
from, or loosening of, responsibility for the reasons mentioned might stimulate 
the producer's and the merchant's irresponsibility which would gravely injure 
consumer interests. Yet there is no contradiction between all this and the 
regulation that in case of cheaper products — and in respect of minor defects 
— the satisfaction of needs can be realized not only by recognizing the pri-
mariness of substitution, but also by priority of repairing the defect. 
On the basis of what has been said, we would regard as well-founded the 
provision of law according to which in case of a minor defect of the thing the 
buyer may request substitution only if the obligor has tried (once or possibly 
twice) to remove the defect through repair unsuccessfully, provided that the 
price of the product does not exceed the value defined in special statutory 
provisions. 
• The question whether substitution should be ensured to the buyer af ter 
one or after two repairs is to be decided by economic considerations. (It is 
irrelevant in this connexion whether the same defect occurs repeatedly, or 
there are different defects, provided as a matter of .course that decision is 
reached for two repairs.) 
Determination of the value limit, which is of fundamental importance as 
concerns the construction, is also subject to economic decision. 
It is not easy to define in the statutory way what is to be regarded as 
minor defect. Much may depend here on wording, since reference to, say, 
small, unessential, etc. defects might have a fur ther degrading effect. The 
following may be conceived for solving the question: 
a) circumscription of the defect in words, thus making an interpretative 
rule; 
b) taking as basis to what extent the defect reduces usability of the 
product (10%—20%); 
c) finally, judgment on a basis which takes into account the percentual 
ratio of the defect compared to the price of the product (e. g. the defect can be 
removed by repair costs of x forints). 
Finally, a requirement to be emphasized as a matter of course is that 
through repair the product must become faultless as concerns proper use, with 
recognizing, however, that repair in itself involves a certain decrease in value. 
Further, it is just as well obvious that has been said now is out of the question 
in case of so-called unfitness. 
(3) Certain authors mention in the- sphere of warranty rights the case of 
so-called replacement; but this is actually a special form of repair and requires 
no statutory regulation of its own. 
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(4) The Civil Code restricts the buyer's right of choice in the manner 
mentioned before through authorizing the seller to answer in the form of 
substitution even if the buyer wishes to enforce some other claim. Needless to 
say, the seller is not supposed to abuse this statutory right. In particular, it 
may be regarded as abuse if the seller wishes to substitute — against the will 
of the buyer — a thing of another type, construction, etc, even if it is the same 
kind of product. The buyer's protest must be granted in such cases even if the* 
thing to be substituted is cheaper than the one given for it; thus in such cases 
the identity of kind must be interpreted in the strictest sense. The situation is 
obviously different if the buyer consents; but in legal terms this is a case 
where an accessorial yet newly created legal relationship realised. 
(5) As concerns repair by others, paragraph (2) of Section 305 of the Civil 
Code provides at present as follows: "Where the obligor does not undertake or 
does not carry out the repair of the thing within a reasonable time, the obligee, 
too, may repair the defect, or have it repaired by some other person, at the-
expense of the obligor." Hence it is a relevant element in the Civil Code rule-
that the obligor does not undertake or carry out the repair; it is assumed 
from the outset that the obligee has contacted the obligor for realizing this, 
claim. 
But in the course of preparatory work on the Civil Code reform a sug-
gestion has compe up wishing to have the right to repair by others recognized 
from a different point of view. Accordingly, the possibility of having the thing 
repaired (or own repair) for removing the defect promptly and simply would 
be ensured to the obligee even if he does not inform the obligor beforehand, 
on the necessity of repair. Yet it is evident prima facie that this solution 
contains the danger of abuse in two directions at least: 
a) The obligee requests reimbursement of "repair costs" from his obligor-
even when no repair has taken place at all, 
b) the obligor is practically unable to ascertain whether the demanded 
amount of costs of repair is well founded. 
As concerns abuse under a), defence is relatively easy since it can be-
ascertained whether the thing has undergone some repair or not. True, the 
obligor would have to take steps for this purpose, and this would weaken the-
possible advantages inherent in the simpleness of this solution. 
On the other hand, to avert the danger of abuse in case under b) is ex-
tremely problematical. This is aggravated by the possibility of collusion whereby 
the invoice given by the otherwise authorized person (e. g. craftsman) may be-
of a substantially higher sum than the actual costs of repair. True, the obligor 
may contest the invoice, but his possibility of proving is rather restricted. 
In view of this, we can conceive the practical realization of this solution, 
only if the burden of proof rests entirely with the buyer. So it is he who must, 
prove that a breakdown has actually occurred, and of what degree it was; 
that repair was justified because of promptness, it even served the "con-
venience" of the obligor, etc. But even in such a case we would regard direct, 
repair — by the obligee or somebody else — to be permissible only below a. 
certain value limit of repair costs. The fact is that the danger of abuse is small 
in case of repairs of minor value. Low sums hardly stimulate unfair practice; 
nor is the seller likely to make a problem of „petty causes". But a possible 
adoption of the solution discussed here would not render the provision in_ 
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paragraph (2) of Section 305 of the Civil Code unnecessary, where preliminary 
notification is a factual condition to apply the same provision, therefore it 
means a different case. 
(6) In connection with withdrawal the conditions of exercising this right 
under the Civil Code are the following: 
— unfitness for proper use, 
— impossibility of proper repair or exceedingly, 
— long duration thereof, or refusal of repair by the obligor, 
— loss of interest in case of delivery of a thing specified in kind and 
quantity. 
As commonly known, the regulative attitude of the Civil Code wished to 
serve much- (and over-) emphasized principle of real performance in natura 
by allowing withdrawal rescinding the contract without such performance 
only exceptionally, in cases strictly delimited by law. The Code provided in 
the same manner also in the sphere of faulty performance, and this resulted 
in withdrawal becoming a secondary warranty claim. 
No special explanation is needed here as to why overstressing of perfor-
mance in natura has become obsolete in the circumstances of the new economic 
system. It is a demand voiced in wide circles — especially by legal practice — 
that withdrawal must be elevated (resp. re-elevated) to the group of primary 
warranty claims. There is an additional point of view to permit a „more ge-
nerous" attitude: by employing the so-called covering purchase, the obligee 
may, in certain cases, have the possibility to obtain the product from another 
source, consequently restriction of withdrawal today would mean an unwar-
ranted limitation on the obligee's position. 
After all, practically everybody agrees with the gradual liquidation of the 
limitations of the right of withdrawal and regards this a tendency to be as-
serted. Yet as concerns immediate and complete deletion, there are certain 
reservations even if they originate in considerations that differ substantially 
from those resulting the limitations found in the Civil Code. 
Those voicing these reservations refer first of all to the contingency that 
unlimited recognition of withdrawal would amount to disproportionate econo-
mic disadvantages to producers and sellers. Especially in case of individual 
delivery, this would result for the seller in remainders of products which 
usually cannot be realized elsewhere. They also refer to consumer abuses, etc. 
and, by and large, we are faced with the same arguments here as mentioned 
in connection with repair and substitution. 
In our view, protection of consumer interests is no unequivocal argument 
either for an unlimited recognition of withdrawal. Namely if the consumer has 
purchased a product to satisfy his needs, this indicates that his needs exist 
objectively; hence it is not unfair towards him that his needs should be satis-
fied — even if with some delay — by the „most radical" removal of the defect, 
i. e. substitution (or possibly repair). This view is, however, opposed by the 
buyer's subjective, negative appraisal arising out of the defect not only in 
connection with the given thing, but often also in connection with the entire 
category of product, and this may discourage him from satisfying his needs 
with a product of this kind. 
The somewhat contradictory conceptions outlined here can — in our view 
— be resolved and reconciled by the following legal solution: 
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1. To include the right of withdrawal in the group of general (ordinary) 
property warranty claims should be accepted as starting and principal rule. 
2. Exercise of the right of withdrawal should be limited in two directions: 
a) The obligor has the right to substitute the product even if withdrawal 
is chosen, i. e. substitution invalidates the right of withdrawal in every case 
(it should be emphasized here, too, that substitution must take place in due 
time, in proper ways, and by a really faultless product of the same type). 
b) Certain binding conditions could mean further limitation, similarly to 
the possibility of substitution being restricted to the priority of repair. 
In constructing the limitation under b), we start essentially from the same 
points of view as we have taken into account in the repair-substitution relation. 
Needless to say, this means only that these points of view have to be taken 
into account, as we have seen, they require legal solutions of clearly opposite 
nature in many a respect in the field of practical realization. What is essential 
here is that adoption of the degree of defect and of a certain value limit as a 
principle of regulation may help us in to settle questions connected with 
withdrawal in the same way as this seemed suitable in the repair-substituting 
relation; the reasons for adopting them as a principle of regulation are the 
same in both cases. 
A suggestion in accordance with the limitation under b) and giving ex-
pression to it: 
ba) Above a definite value limit, the buyer may withdraw from the contract 
without any restriction, that means irrespective of the degree of defect. But 
withdrawal can be repudiated by substitution also in this case. 
bb) If the price of the product is below the fixed value limit, but the 
defect is serious or substantial — even if it does not reach the level of unfitness 
— the obligee may withdraw. Withdrawal may be repudiated by substitution 
also in this case. 
be) If the price of the product is below the fixed value limit and the 
defect is of .minor importance, there is no possibility for withdrawal. Only 
repair may be requested in such a case, according to what has been said above. 
Naturally, the possibility of removing the defect through substitution by the 
obligor is given also in this sphere if he does not wish to, or cannot, meet the 
claim for repair for any reason. 
As concerns the delimitation of the relevant value limit, or the serious or 
minor nature of the defect, all what we have presented in the repair-substitu-
tion relation is valid also here respectively. It is an essential point of view of 
ours that objective criteria must be taken as the basis first of all to establish 
the seriousness of the defect; the buyer's subjective judgment may not be 
taken into account in this respect, all the less since we tried to comply with 
it in another form. 
(7) Costs incurred in connection with faulty performance and claimed by 
the obligee under warranty. The right to get refunded the expenses due to the 
obligee because of faulty performance is usually not grouped with the warranty 
claims. The main reason for this may presumably be their accessorial nature. 
The fact is that expenditure connected with the removal of defects is usually 
incurred by the obligor, in his sphere of interest, from the very beginning. It 
is usually not contested that the obligor cannot claim reimbursement of wages, 
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value of the material used, etc. in case of repair burdening him; these expenses 
are incurred while he discharges his obligation resulting from statutory-
provisions. 
A legal regulation concerning expenses is therefore needed practically only 
if these are incurred by the obligee because they are necessary for removing 
the defect. Paragraph (2) of Section 305 of the Civil Code provides accordingly 
by charging the obligor expressly with the expenses of repair carried out not 
by the same. 
Provisions on expenses in general are contained in paragraph (1) of Section 
358 of the Civil Code, providing that expenditure necessary for eliminating or 
reducing the prejudice suffered by the injured person must be included in the 
compensation. Following from Section 318 on the common rules of breach of 
contract, this precept is governing also faulty performance. From a merely 
formal comparison of the statutory provisions in question it would therefore 
follow that the precondition of bearing costs is imputability as generally 
required in the sphere of compensation. But it goes without saying that such 
interpretation would be seriously detrimental to the consumer. 
In order to avoid any ambiguousity, we consider it indispensable to declare 
that the expenses incurred by the obligor in connection with faulty performance 
must be charged to the obligor and may not be refunded by the consumer. 
Conversely, the expenses incurred by the obligee buyer or consumer in con-
nection with defect and aimed at removal of the defect may be claimed by the 
obligee under warranty. (In practice, this means first of all expenses of trans-
port, forwarding, repairs carried out by the obligee, or for him by others, etc.) 
By elevating the claim to expenses to the rank of a warranty claim, there 
emerges a natural concomitant, i. e. that the general solutions relating to the 
legal basis of obligations under warranty, to the burden of proof, to the man-
ner and terms of claim enforcement, apply also to this warranty claim. 
(8) As concerns compensation connected with faulty performance, it is 
sufficient to state here that settlement of damage occurring in the consumer-
seller relation requires special regulation and is a question to be separated 
from the bearing of expenses. (This is not necessarily the same situation as in 
case of so-called linked-up relations — retail t rade — wholesale trade — pro-
ducer — where expenses appear, or may appear as part of damages.) 
Different situations require regulations on partly different principles. Thus 
the claim for compensation cannot be grouped simply with the warranty claims 
as was possible in respect of expenses. 
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I I . 
Manner and terms of asserting warranty claims 
A) Pursuant to provisions contained is Section 306 of the Civil Code, the 
rules of claim assertion differ according to whether the defect is recognizable 
or is not recognizable (latent defect). Terms and manner of claim assertion: 
a) in case of a recognizable defect, by means of a declaration within eight 
days from the termination of examination; 
b) in case of a latent defect, by means of a declaration within eight days 
from the date of discovering the defect, but not later than within six months 
f rom the examination of the thing delivered; 
c) in case of any defect, by means of action brought within six months 
f rom making the declaration (expect if the parties have agreed upon warranty 
of longer duration); 
d) in case of any defect, by means of exception against claims deriving 
from the same legal title, provided that the obligee has made the declaration 
in due time. 
B) Civil Law Principled Decision XXXI of the Supreme Court provides in 
this connection that 
— if, owing to the nature of the defect or to the nature of delivery, the 
defect of the thing delivered can be recognized only after longer examination, 
the term of six months fixed for making the declaration needed for the asser-
tion of warranty rights shall — unless otherwise agreed upon — be reckoned 
from the date when the defect might have been discovered by thorough 
examination; 
— if the parties have conducted negotiations promising of success in settl-
ing warranty claims, but no agreement has been reached, from this it shall be 
concluded with good reason in given cases that there exists concordant will of 
the parties to have wished to reckon the term of six months fixed for bringing 
action from the date when it became evident from the circumstances of the 
case that there is no prospect any more of settling their legal dispute through 
agreement. 
— Paragraph d) of the Principled Decision provides, too, that if the obligor 
repairs the defective thing on the basis of warranty, the period of prescription 
is prolonged with the perios of time, beginning from notification about the 
defect, during which the obligee was not able to use the thing properly on 
account of the defect; if the thing, or some part of it, has been substituted, the 
period of prescription shall begin anew in respect of the thing (part of thing) 
substituted. 
Some important questions of the legislation reform 
There seems to be an overwhelming public opinion of legal experts which 
estimates the Civil Code rules relating to the ways of enforcing warranty 
claims in the sphere of faulty performance as failed in practice; and, among 
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others, exactly because they give preference to the position of the seller (pro-
ducer i. e. of the obligor, over the position of the buyer (consumer, user), i. e. 
the obligee. Civil Law Principled Decision XXXI tried to solve, resp. resolve, 
the greatest problems posed to legal practice. 
For truth's sake we must conclude that the passing of the P. D. was 
timely and served the purposes of legal practice, despite the problems of sources 
of law resulting from the principled decision. 
A) Starting date of claim assertion; obligation to examine on the part of the 
consumer; distinction between apparent and latent defects 
The question connected with the starting date of claim assertion must 
sharply be separated dogmatically from the problem at what date the object of 
delivery, or the performance, must be faultless; in practice, the probability 
of a coincidence of the two dates is very high. But there may be differences 
in given cases, such as in case of the obligee's delay. Faultlessness must exist 
also in such cases at the date when performance according to the contract is 
offered, although it is evident that the starting date in respect of claim asser-
tion can only be the date of actual acceptance by the obligee even so. 
1. As concerns legal regulation, the following alternatives can be considered 
in respect of the starting date: a) date of tradition, resp. acceptance; b) date 
of contractual offer on the part of the obligor, or the date of devolution of 
the risk; c) completion of the examination of the accepted product on the part 
of the obligee; d) date of putting into service (resetting); e) the date of com-
mencement of putting to use. 
Ad. a) There is an opinion which may be termed fairly widespread, and is 
supported mainly by practical considerations at the same time, namely that the 
simplest and therefore most practicable thing to do for the proper functioning 
of the warranty system is to fix the starting date of warranty claim assertion 
as the date when acceptance takes place. 
Considerable advantage are attached to such solution: in the great majori ty 
of cases, no major difficulties are involved in ascertaining the date of accep-
tance; the rule is comprehensible and clear to everybody, and, above all, is 
clear-cut enough to avoid uncertainties appearing in connection with other 
solutions. All this facilitates claim assertion, and is therefore in good agreement 
with consumer interest protection. 
There are actually two objections that can be raised, to this solution. One 
is that recognition of acceptance as the starting date involves a certain shorten-
ing of the claim assertion term in comparison to present law. At present, the 
term of assertion does not yet begin to run during the time required for exami-
nation, while according to the suggested solution it does. But, in our view, 
this is of no essential consequence. Not only because a negligible period of 
time is involved, but also because the prescription construction to be outlined 
in the following puts the entire problem in a different light. 
The second objection is of practical nature and argues that ascertainment 
of the date of acceptance is not always a simple task; for instance, if purchase 
takes place in a shop it is sometimes problematical whether the article for 
which the buyer wishes to assert a warranty claim was purchased actually at 
a certain time, in a given shop, and whether it is actually the same article. 
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But it may be taken for almost sure that the difficulties arising in connection' 
with "identification", or their frequency, are substantially smaller than with., 
any other solution, and that the difficulties of proving are also easier to solve. 
A further argument to "fight down" the objection discussed now is the 
fact that the date when the buyer has taken over the thing must be known 
even if the claim assertion system tied with the terminating date of examina-
tion is applied. 
Ad. b) The contractual offer made by the obligor, and the devolution of 
risk may (or at least might) govern the date at which the cause of defect 
should, or should not exist in the thing; this may be of great importance as. 
concerns „relief" from liability under warranty. We have indicated before that 
a different view must be applied to the choice of the starting date of claim 
assertion; no time fixing mentioned above is suited for starting dates. Apart 
from dogmatical considerations, it would not be proper to employ these because-
their intelligibility, their, accurate content, is highly doubtful to the consumer. 
Ad. c) As concerns the fixing of the starting date, the Civil Code regards 
the termination of examination as decisive; the various legal declarations must 
be made within a certain time counted from this date. Also in the case of 
so-called latent defects, the starting date of the objective terms is the termina-
tion of the examination of the thing delivered. The quoted Principled Desision 
XXXI gives an interpretation, among others, of when the examination can be-
regarded as terminated. 
It is perhaps the aforementioned solution that aroused the keenest criticism 
among the warrenty rules of the Civil Code. It was argued — and rightly — 
that quality examination cannot be expected from the buyer, from the consu-
mer, at least not in the way and to the extent that could ensure objectively 
the disclosure of the defect in every case. It goes without saying that the-
expectations of society towards socialist organizations in such cases are al-
together different from the requirements the ordinary buyer and consumer is 
expected to meet. 
A practical problem connected with the former, but perhaps still more 
difficult, is the duration of time required for examination. By statutory pro-
vision, this can only be prescribed in outline, within limits; experience has 
shown that any kind of strict rule causes extreme difficulties of proving, forces 
courts to give far-fetched explanations. Such terms as „at once", „without 
delay", „within the shortest time possible" used in statutory provisions are 
perhaps required by the nature of a given delivery; but for legal practice in. 
concreto they present almost unsurmountable difficulties. 
It need not be argued that any legal construction which is ambigous, 
moreover, rather vague in one of the most decisive questions, namely in respect, 
of the starting date of claim assertion, has a deterimental effect on consumer 
interest protection. The arguments we have adduced are certainly weighty 
enough to enforce the giving up of the said Civil Code construction. 
To place examination in the centre for fixing the starting date must be-
given up, if only for the reason that — according to our conception mentioned 
before — examination should cease to be a legal obligation on the part of the-
consumer. We do not consider this to be an inconsistency of principle, even in 
view of the idea of the obligation to cooperate as asserted in the Civil Code.. 
Consumer protection is such an important requirement of legal and economic 
policy that it must be met by legal regulation, and the consumer, the buyer 
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must not be burdened with the discharge of an obligation — not to be expected 
reasonably from him — only for serving the cooperation principle formally. 
(The text of the GB decision is „tuning" toward this.) 
Ad. d) Paragraph (2) of Section 6 of the Guaranty Decree regards the fact 
•of putting into operation (re-setting) as the starting date of claim assertion in 
certain cases. This view can, and must be, asserted also in the sphere of war-
ranty. It is clear, however, that this is not the principal rule (also the said 
decree regards tradition as the principal rule), it is only a supplementary pro-
vision. The prescription construction suggested for the sphere of warranty 
solves the problem satisfactorily, owing to the rules suspension thereof. 
Ad. e) Taking the date of putting to use as the starting date is in con-
formity with public opinion, and seemingly serves consumer protection well at 
the same time. Decree 1/1964 of the Minister of Home Trade mentions this 
possibility expressly, but only as concerns goods of lasting use, and if putting 
to use can be proved not to have taken place at the date of purchase. This rule 
in paragraph (2) of Section 5 aims perceptibly at the correction of the rigidity 
of the solution in the Civil Code. But to tie the starting date to the date of 
putting to use would perhaps result in a still worse uncertainty than taking 
examination as base. It would be difficult to elevate the said solution to the 
rank of a principal rule also because of the fact that putting to use in the 
ordinary sense is not the case with every product. And the most serious oppos-
ing view is that a possible dispute would now be focussed not on the time 
required for examination, but on the question of when the putting to use has 
taken place, or should have taken place. 
But all this does not exclude utilization of the said construction in the 
form of a supplementary rule. This will be the correct solution if things and 
circumstances are involved from which it is evident (or may be rendered 
highly probable on the basis of average cases) that putting to use takes place 
at a certain date, and this date is a substantially later one than the date of 
acceptance (e. g. in case of summer-season articles purchased in winter). As a 
matter of fact, there already exists a tendency in business practice to pay 
regard to this point of view. 
(2) As we have mentioned, termination of examination must not be 
construed as the starting date of claim assertion, all the less since we do not 
consider examination to be the consumer's obligation in the legal sense whose 
breach would entail loss of rights. 
On the basis of what we have said, our conclusion is unambigous: accep-
tance must be stated as the starting date of claim assertion; the circumstances 
described in paragraph (1) under ad d) and ad e) must be utilized supplemen-
tary rules. 
(3) Adoption of the mentioned solution would in effect give a logical sense, 
to our standpoint concerning the other principal question which is connected 
with this theme, namely how the distinction between apparent and latent de-
fects should be handled in fu ture regulation. It ought to be emphasized that 
this question may be raised only from the point of view whether such distinc-
tion is necessary in respect of the starting date of claim assertion. Namely it is 
not open to any dispute in the technical sense whether the things delivered 
have apparent defects in some cases, and latent ones in others, and this dif-
ference may be of importance — in other instances — as concerns legal 
judgment (so-called evident defects). 
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Yet as concerns the starting date of claim assertion, there is usually no-
need for this distinction. It has become obsolete first of all because a) examina-
tion by the consumer is not regarded as a legal obligation; b) the date when-
the defect manifests itself (at once, or only after a certain length of use) is of 
no delimiting importance as concerns claim assertion, at least not within the-
general period of warranty. Assertion of claims must be ensured unconditio-
nally up to a definite date (warranty period), irrespective of when the defect 
has become manifest, when it has become known, ascertainable, etc. within 
the statutory period. It is only such a solution that can serve the highly 
desirable simplification of regulation, and, thereby, the protection of consumer-
interests. 
B) Questions of legislation connected with the period and manner 
of claim assertion 
Ba. The period fixed for asserting claims 
Fixing the concrete duration of warranty period is basically not a question, 
of principle and dogmatics; it is much rather a practical question usually-
decided on the basis of considerations of legal policy and expediency. The-
present period — which may be termed as general — for asserting claims is 6 
months. This may be prolonged practically to a year in certain cases without,, 
however, the division according to 6-month terms being given up by the Ci-
vil Code. 
We are of the opinion that also future regulation should fix a 6-month-
period as principal rule for asserting claims under warranty. That as a result 
of the constructional changes suggested here (mainly to establish prescription: 
instead of loss of right) the effects and importance of the 6-month period differ-
from the effects of the period contained in the Civil Code, is another matter. 
The most important considerations supporting maintenance of the 6-month. 
period are these: 
a) A generally accepted requirement — asserted in legal regulation — is 
that the period during which warranty claims are to be asserted should be-
relatively short; and, especially, that it should be substantially shorter than 
the general period of prescription. This is. justified by a stricter responsibility,, 
by problems of proving, etc. 
b) The warranty period of 6 months is commonly known, familiar, and is 
increasingly realized by wide circles of citizens — if such a statement may-
come up at all in this field. 
c) The attempts at consolidation desirable in regulation under civil law 
take a stand for maintaining the 6-month period; also the statutory provisions 
on contracts of product-supply use this period (apart from the case of un-
fitness). 
d) Protection of consumer interests does not require by all means a general 
lengthening of the period of warranty liability. It rather requires the the con-
sumer should be given the possibility of asserting his claim even after 6 months 
if this is really necessary and justified. (This requirement is best served by the-
prescription construction.) 
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Bb. The nature of the period of claim assertion 
If, as we have said, the length of warranty periods is decided first of all 
by practical considerations, this is certainly not the case with determining the 
nature of such periods. The principal question is this: should expiry of the 
fixed period entail loss of rights, or should it be a so-called period of pre-
scription? There is no need here for proving the highly important practical 
-effects of this difference in nature; the fact is that this is again a sensitive 
point in the regulation of the Civil Code which has given rise to extremely 
hot debates, and was attacked fiercely from the angle of practice. In this con-
nection it has to be mentioned again that the aforesaid principled decision of 
the Supreme Court has greatly limited the actual applicability of the pertinent 
Civil Code rules, has even rendered them effectless by transforming in certain 
cases the loos-of-right periods essentially into periods of prescription, and not 
even in a covert manner. 
Numerous arguments are known for and against the loss-of-right and the 
prescription constructions. Of these we shall deal only with the most funda-
mental ones; they are of such a weight in themselves that they will — in our 
•opinion — decide the question of choice. 
It is a known fact that the chief advantage of periods entailing loss of 
rights is strict determination and that, as a result, they prevent any consider-
able protraction of legal disputes; after expiration of a certain time, they not 
only result in a non-enforceability of claims, but also in the extinguishment of 
title. Such periods are cogent in principle, hence they cannot be modified 
through agreement. (The fact is, however, that this characteristic of the loss of 
rights is not taken into account consistently even by the Civil Code, and could 
not be taken into account especially by judicial practice.) 
At the same time, the greatest disadvantage of such periods is what we 
have presented as an advantage in the foregoing. Owing to their definiteness 
and rigour, they have proved in practice extremely rigid and cumbersome; in 
several cases, they have not made possible for the obligee to assert his claim 
when this sould have been justified according to the consideration of the judge, 
and — we may add — according to legal public opinion as well, especially 
because there was nothing that could have been imputed to the obligee. It 
.admits of no doubt that the loss of rights, too, serves social-economic interests 
formally and in a definite sense; it ensures forcefully that, after a certain 
time, it should not be possible to raise claims against producers, makers, etc. 
and to impair their economic activities in this way. 
But, as concerns consumer protection, we can agree with these considera-
tions only to the extent that it is a case of unfounded claims. The modern 
system of quality protection involves necessarily the possibility of raising a 
claim — even if at a later date — if this is justified and ivell founded. And 
this for the simple reason that the obligor has delivered a thing of inadequate 
quality, and that the obligee was able to perceive or feel the resulting effects 
only af ter a longer time through no fault of his own. This expectation is 
expressed by a passage in the decision of the Economic Committee according 
to which "it shall be ensured that the customer, the buyer, be able, up to a 
reasonable ultimate time limit, to enforce his rights resulting from faulty 
performance even after the general period of warranty in case of such a defect 
as was not ascertainable, owing to its nature, whithin the normal period of 
warranty." 
Thus both the quality potection system and consumer protection argue 
against the periods of loss of rights. Judicial practice mentioned before resulted 
actually from the realization of this situation. 
The advantage of the prescription system, over the loss of rights actually 
follows f rom what we have said: this system is elastic, gives larger room for 
movement to the courts in problematical cases, and serves consumer interests 
much better. 
However, just as the advantages inherent in the loss of rights can become 
their greatest disadvantage in given cases, this is valid conversely also for the 
prescription construction. Compared to the advantages we have outlined, the 
very disadvantage of prescription may be the fact that it can become too 
"elastic"; it may offer opportunity to the judge to apply the rules of warranty 
even in unjustified cases: the consumer may enjoy legal protection in cases 
where this is no longer justified economically and this may afflict the producer, 
the maker badly. 
Dangers of other nature, which accompany these two solutions, are of 
different import. Loss of rights pays regard to the interests of the producer, of 
the obligor, institutionally and permits no exception to the advantage of the 
consumer; one legal expression of this is, e. g., the extinguishment of the 
substantive right. On the other hand, elasticity that accompanies prescription 
is not aimed at any one-sided protection of the consumer beyond reasonable 
limits. The danger that consumers may try to exploit this elasticity for abuses 
can be eliminated, or restricted to a minimum, through legal regulation and 
concordant judicial practice, and the guiding activity of the Supreme Court 
first of all. 
Hence we suggest that the general time limit for asserting claims resulting 
from warranty should be fixed as a short period (6 months) to be counted 
from acceptance. This period should be established as prescription. 
Bf. The time limit fixed for asserting claims under warranty, 
and the degree of the defect 
It is a requirement in law making often voiced that statutory regulation 
should take into account the degree of the defect, its seriousness, in determin-
ing the time limit for asserting claims. The frequently heard argument of those 
holding this view is that a more serious defect requires a more serious sanction, 
and that this must be manifest in a longer term for claim assertion. This idea 
is expressed positively in the statutory provision on contracts of product-
supply: it contains a 3-year period for claim assertion in cases of unfitness, and 
only a period of 6 months in other cases. 
The difference between unfitness and property-deficient deliveries which 
do not result in unfitness appears also in the Civil Code; it is, however, not 
applied in respect of time limits, only in respect of the claims to be asserted. 
A distinction of defects for this purpose is necessary as before, as we have 
tried to show. What follows from this in turn is this: we do not accept that 
such distinction should be given importance for shaping the warranty period. 
The first argument for abandoning this distinction is that the transition 
between the poles of unfit and property-deficient deliveries is rather manifold, 
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that judgment depends on objective and subjective factors alike, and that this 
complexity only causes difficulties in the practical application of the law. 
Reference is often made in the second place to circumstance that it makes 
no difference whether the thing delivered is unfit or just property-deficient, 
because the obligor has not met his obligation to deliver a faultless thing in 
either case, and has committed breach of contract in both cases. And to sanc-
tion property deficiency less seriously than unfitness, is not justified by the 
interests of property protection from the standpoint of legal policy either. 
The mentioned argumentation seems us hardly convincing. Should the 
establishing of unfitness and/or deficiency cause inappropriate difficulties for 
legal practice what has been one of the arguments dealt with above: this 
distinction must be dismissed from the point of view of choice between claims, 
under warranty, too; however, such distinction is already contained in the 
Civil Code without having raised substantial difficulties in its application in 
practice. 
The weak point of the argument mentioned second is that its consistent! 
assertion would actually exclude differentiation from any point of view within 
the warranty system. This would eventually lead to a situation where only the 
objective materialization of breach of contract would be seen one-sidedly in 
every faulty performance, and an entirely identically and mechanically working 
system of sanctions would be constructed by disregarding all considerations 
of legal policy, economics, etc. Another weak point of the above argument is 
that it poses the question like this: why should the property-deficient by 
sanctioned less seriously than the unfit? in our view, the case is the opposite: 
the property-deficient is sanctioned according to general rules, and the unfi t 
is judged more strictly by a possible prolongation of the claim assertion period. 
We feel that the question should be decided while making use of the ideas 
analysed, yet from another approach in a certain sense. That all forms of faulty 
performance must be sanctioned is an incontestable requirement which needs 
no detailed explanation. But from the angle of legal policy, the requirement of 
sanctioning alike is not identical with sanctioning in the same manner. -
Sanctioning „not in the same manner" can be realized in two ways, as 
follows from what has been said: 
a) with a differentiated fixing of the period of answerability (claim 
assertion), 
b) by weighting the warranty claims. 
As concerns consumer interests, b) is obviously more advantageous. Namely 
this would actually mean for the buyers, etc. that if an „unfit" thing is 
delivered to them (and, consequently, repair in the physical sense is out of the 
question), they have the unconditional choice of the two strongest and most 
efficient warranty claims, i. e. substitution or withdrawal. At the side of the 
obligor, this is a serious sanction which is a powerful "negative stimulation", 
has a restraining effect. 
If, however, we accept this (our earlier suggestion is aimed at this; it 
would restrict the right of withdrawal only in case of minor defects of pro-
ducts below the value limit, i. e. ensures this right in case of unfitness, even in 
case of serious defect not amounting to unfitness), then it is really unjustified 
to sanction unfitness with a „surplus" by extending the period of claim asser-
tion. Grave breach of contract entails vindication of the most weighty claims 
of warranty; consequently it would be unfounded in principle to make possible 
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the assertion of the most serious sanctions within a substantially longer period 
at the same time. 
Be it said incidentally by way of conclusion that realistic considerations 
do not require a special, long period in respect of unfitness; the complete 
unfitness of the thing delivered usually becomes manifest already in the initial 
period of use. 
Bg. Assertion period of warranty claims according to the types of delivery 
Various provisions of law sometimes bring into connection the period of 
assertion with the types of delivery, in other cases with the types of contract. 
The possibility of grouping on the latter basis is not worth of being considered 
.,seriously; the subject matters of delivery contained in identical types of cont-
ract show such a great variety that differentiation on this basis is practically 
.altogether excluded. 
Grouping based on the diverseness of the types of delivery (actually of 
the kinds of product forming the subject matter of delivery) is possible in 
theory. The distinction between goods for single use and durable goods seems 
best suited for this purpose; the difference according to the nature of these 
goods is, in the last analysis, the economic basis of the differences between 
warranty and guaranty. 
Nevertheless, based on practical considerations, we do not think that dif-
ferentiation of general validity should be justified on the basis of the types of 
delivery. It cannot be disregarded that the transitional variations coming up 
here would cause really serious problems, first of all on the level of law-
making, and then even worse in legal practice. Reference in the wording of 
.statutes to goods of single use and durable goods would, in itself, evidently be 
insufficient for a firm legal practice. The situation is different in the sphere of 
regulation relating to guaranty where the appendix to the statutory provision 
contains an itemized enumeration of the durable goods (not all of them, to be 
sure) to which the rules of guaranty apply. Yet such an itemization is inconceiv-
able on the level of an act or in connection with it. 
Hence the actually existing difference between types of delivery is not 
suited for serving as a basis of a generally valid differentiation of the periods 
of claim assertion. On the other hand, it raises the idea of making certain 
distinctions as to some clearly circumscribed types of product. Realities of life 
call for such a distinction in certain cases, they are known to a lesser or greater 
extent even now, and invove no special difficulties of regulation. Such cases are: 
a) Owing to their nature, foodstuffs and the so-called perishable goods are 
judged specially; the "warranty system" relating to these shows considerable 
departures from general regulation in respect of time limits and warranty 
rights. 
b) Although this is not within the scope of the basic model we have chosen, 
we mention that a longer period of claim assertion relating to buildings (real 
property) is a provision asserted fairly generally in statutory regulation. 
c) For the sake of completeness we should like to mention that, in our 
•opinion, the warranty system connected with the sale of animals, and showing 
certain departures from general rules, should be maintained. 
.3 K e m e n e s Acta 
Bh. Effect of statutorily (officially) determined quality requirements 
on the period of claim assertion 
A problem often discussed in legal literature, and kept current also by 
legal practice, is whether the quality specifications determined compulsorily by 
statutory provisions (or by authorities in given cases) are of importance, or 
have any effect in respect of the periods of warranty claim assertion. 
As concerns the theme we are discussing, this question may be formulated 
like this: whether the time limits specified in standards for durability resp. 
keeping as (one) quality requirement have any influence on the claim assertion 
period available to the consumer. 
The quoted decision of the Economic Committee contains the following in 
this connection: „For the period of durability determined compulsorily in 
standards, a statutory obligation of warranty shall come into existence." From 
all this it follows, both for the assertion of the quality protection system and 
for the protection of consumer interests that if the period of durability spe-
cified in a standard exceeds the general time limit for asserting property war-
ranty claims, then this time limit is automatically extended up to the limit 
(but not longer) of durability or keeping determined in the pertinent standard. 
It should be emphasized, however, that such a claim is well-founded only 
if it is expressly based on the circumstance that the product does not meet the 
durability or keeping specifications determined in the standard, i. e. that the 
defect is in causal nexus with this circumstance. As concerns defects ascribable 
to other causes, the general period of claim assertion will apply in the future, 
too, as a matter of course. We do not suggest, however, to declare the reverse 
of this rule, namely for the case when the period of keeping specified in a 
standard is shorter than the period of prescription (6 months according to our 
suggestion). The edge of this question is greatly blunted by the circumstance 
that standard specifications of keeping, consumability, etc. shorter than 6 
months relate for the most part to types of product (food, etc.) which are 
governed by special rules anyway. 
Bi. Correlation of the claim assertion period with the price of the product 
(1) Doubtless, one of the most problematical — or thrilling, of you like it 
— questions is to decide whether it is justified to bring into connection the 
warranty claims and the periods for their assertion with the price of the 
product. (We have discussed this question in other connexions several times.) 
It is a demand of many practical (legal and economic) experts to assert 
the aforesaid principle in legal regulation in the future. They refer in this 
connection to so-called consumer abuses whose sphere could be restricted if 
only a short period of claim assertion were available in respect of articles 
below a certain value limit of price. It is often said, too, that even public 
opinion shows understanding for a regulation where smaller rights are due to 
the buyer in case of a cheap product than in case of an expensive one. 
Needless to say, these arguments have their „wrong side". True, it is a 
fact that protection against consumer abuses is necessary also through the 
means of legal regulation; it must be asked, however, whether the proportion 
of such abuses is great enough to justify a fundamental effect on the entire 
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regulation system. The proportion of consumer complaints is low in itself, and" 
the abuse of rights amounts to a small fraction of these. And insistence on the-
argument that smaller rights should be due to the buyer in case of cheaper 
products is aimed much more at a narrowing down of the sphere of warranty 
claims than at restricting the periods of assertion. 
It must be admitted without reservation that here we are faced with a 
principle which is highly problematical for economic considerations and also 
in that it presents a civilistic legal attitude that professes the equivalence of 
performance and counter-performance. Actually, the standpoint expressed in 
the background of this regards also warranty as a merchandise and correlates 
the degree of warranty with the value of the same. 
This poblem cannot be decided simply by saying that faultlessness may be 
expected from a cheaper product, too, that even a cheaper product must be 
suited for meeting its economic purpose, i. e. proper use. Namely what can be 
set against this fortwith is that the ordinary consumer, too, is aware of the 
fact that the degree and duration of the usability of a cheaper product is 
smaller than that of an expensive product. A lower price level obviously means 
a lower level of serviceableness, meets needs on a lower level. The principal 
question here is whether a shorter period of usability is linked with a lower 
level of usability. It is here that, in our opinion, we find the core of the ques-
tion and the starting-point of the solution as well. What must be accepted here-
is that the level of serviceableness is lower as a result of the lower price; but 
the period of use to be expected reasonably is not necessarily shorter in case 
of such a lower level of serviceableness. Consequently we have to take our start, 
from the notion that the price of the product may not in itself and directly 
result in any automatic modification of the period (of 6 months) laid down 
with general validity for asserting claims under warranty; assertion of the-
contractual interest must be ensured also in such cases. 
Yet as concerns the principle discussed now, we hold it to be utilizable-
from another point of vieio in the following manner: 
a) If compulsory quality specifications for a given product fix a period 
shorter than 6 months in respect of durability, keeping, serviceableness, etc., 
shortening of the period for claim assertion may be employed as the first-
condition. 
b) A fur ther connected point of view is that the price of the product 
should be below the price fixed in special provisions of law, or, more exactly" 
should not touch it. Hence application of this principle depends on two con-
ditions, which are — most emphatically — in a relationship of conjunction.. 
The simultaneous prevalance of these two conditions must be insisted upon, 
because: 
a) compulsory provisions connected merely with the quality requirement, 
are not enough for shortening the period of claim assertion as these usually 
have only an indirect effect on the price (the price of articles intended for 
short use may be high, too, e. g. in case of fancy-articles), 
b) the price of the article may not be decisive in itself either, because-
usability of 6 months at least may usually be expected even from products of 
lower price. 
We are aware of the fact that practical assertion of this principle in this-
sphere (i. e. the period of claim assertion) will be of a relatively negligible 
volume. Namely quality specifications require durability, etc. shorter than 6 
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months only exceptionally. And where this is the practice (food, highly perish-
.able products), special rules are governing. But the possibility of a practical 
realization of this principle had to be left open nevertheless; and if it is realized 
in a limited sphere, this must only regarded as favourable for the protec-
tion of consumer interests. 
Summing up: if a compulsory specification relating to the usability of a 
product lays down a period shorter than 6 months for such usability, and if 
-the consumer price does not exceed the limit fixed by provision of law, then 
the period fixed for asserting warranty claims should be according to a special 
rule in the pertinent provision of law; in lack of such special rule, it should 
be according to the compulsory specification mentioned above. 
Presenting the simultaneous application of these dual conditions would 
practically exclude the possibility of any misuse of this rule by the seller. On 
the other hand, the consumers' interests would be served only semmingly if 
reduction of the period of claim assertion were linked exclusively with a lower 
level of the consumer price. It might be that this would result a lowering in 
prices in respect of certain products; but a rather serious countereffect for the 
consumer would be the resulting short period of liability to the advantage of 
the seller, let alone the fact that the new price fixed through such price reduc-
tion would usually hardly be lower than the value limit fixed for the given case. 
Finally,,- we regard it as self-evident that no attention need be paid to 
very cheap mass products in elaborating the principles of legal regulation. In 
principle, a certain answerability for quality may be expected also for these; 
but this question is negligible in practice. 
C. Notification on the warranty claim; filing of action 
The present legal regulation connected with the obligation to give notifica-
tion on the presence of a defect is in the focus of the third main set of prob-
lems involved in the assertion of warranty claims. Valid Hungarian law 
• demands in every case that notification by the obligee on the presence of a 
defect towards the obligor (possibly his agent) must precede enforcement of 
claims through action. As known, the Civil Code employs the so-called two-
phase solution: it lays down separate time limits for notification, and for the 
enforcement of claims through action in case of unsuccessful notification. Re-
gulations dealing with contracts of product-supply require preliminary notifica-
tion, too, but contain no separate phases for notifications and filing of action, 
i. e. follow the so-called single-phase system. 
The arguments for the obligation to give notification are usually based on 
• considerations to avoid actions, to employ them economically. Since, as a result 
of notification, the dispute of the parties can be, and usually is, settled out of 
court, the obligee must t ry to settle the dispute in this way — this is what the 
defenders of the notification obligation say. This is a remarkable point of view, 
but is not void of a certain one-sidedness. It must be admitted, too, that among 
the various comments connected with the rules on faulty performance in the 
Civil Code, the obligation to give notification is usually not a matter of cri-
ticism. What is contested in fact is not the expediency of an obligation to 
notificate, but rather more whether it is proper to set a time limit for giving 
notification under the sanction of losing the warranty right (this they consider 
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as a breach of principle if the prescription period would be adopted). It is 
contested, too, whether it is expedient to determine subsequent separate time 
limits for notification and for filing the action. As concerns pertinent sugges-
tions, it is felt that the majority standpoint is for the single-time-limit system 
known in the sphere of contracts of product-supply. Given these circumstances, 
it has actually not been suggested that the obligation of notification should be 
removed from the system of property warranty. Notification is, in general, 
regarded as an obligation to be continued, and debates, if any, are centered 
on the nature of notification and the time limit to be fixed for it. 
However, according to our conviction, it is justified to ask, for the reasons 
to be discussed, whether it is necessary also in the fu ture to maintain notifica-
tion as a legal obligation, i. e. to continue to assert the construction in which 
notification is a" necessary precondition of action at law. Namely any construc-
tion which qualifies notification as a legal obligation invests it — intentionally 
or not — actually with the force of forfeiture because it regards it as the 
precondition of filing an action. In other words: if there exists the obligation 
to give notification, then an action brought immedaitely without having given 
notification entails failure of action from the outset, because the court cannot 
but dismiss the action without hearing the case on its merits since the party 
concerned failed to give notification. Starting from this basis, we are of the 
opinion that to interpret notification as a legal obligation is obsolete; regulation 
insisting on notification causes unnecessary practical difficulties which are 
contestable dogmatically; and such a regulation makes no sense especially in 
view of the construction which does not qualify examination as a legal obliga-
tion either. 
The most substantial arguments for our standpoint are these: 
a) The situation is which failure of the consumer (buyer) to give notifica-
tion which in given cases may be a neglect of administrative nature on his 
part renders the assertion of his claim at court hopeless from the outset, is a 
solution which gives rise to misgivings beyond doubt. And making notification 
compulsory entails such an effect almost inevitably. 
b) However desirable it be to influence the parties concerned through 
legal regulation to try to settle their disputes out of court, this may not be the 
decisive point of view. This argument could be accepted as decisive for our 
case only if both substantive and procedural law would require an attempt at 
preliminary settlement out of court in every legal dispute. We do know that 
this is not so; hence it is clearly unjustified to insist on such a rigorous obliga-
tion in the sphere of warranty which is of great concern to the citizens. 
c) Although in other connexions, it is an often ^voiced view that the rules 
connected with notification, the special time limits relating to it, the rules 
relating to the manner and form of notification, involve an unnecessary burden-
ing of the legal knowledge of citizens. Making notification compulsory inevitably 
requires inclusion of regulative details in the statutes; therefore, and in this 
sense, abandonment of notification would absolutely act in the direction of 
simplification. 
By taking into account what we have presented, we deem it expedient 
to shape a legal construction in which notification is not qualified as an ob-
ligation in the legal sense, and, consequently, is not to be sanctioned specially. 
But we would abandon reality, and would close our eyes to obvious facts, if 
we disregarded, or were not expressly aware of, the circumstance that despite 
removal of notification from the sphere of obligations, it would remain a 
natural manifestation on the part of the obligee in a considerable number of 
cases, or probably in their majority. It should be noted in parentheses that this 
is the very argument often heard for maintaining notification; but, in our 
view, this equally speaks for abandoning the same; if notification continues 
to be general practice, there is certainly no need for formulating it as an 
obligation. Our suggestion for abandoning the obligation to give notification 
means in no way that regulation should not take into account cases where such 
a notification is given by the buyer. But it means a difference of attitude 
whether we regard notification as an obligation and sanction the failure to 
give it (and acutally with the loss of rights according to what we have said), 
or reward the fact of notification with certain advantages. These advantages are: 
a) Notification given within the general period of warranty should be 
vested, with an effect that interrupts prescription. 
b) In harmony with the general principles of procedural law, the idea may 
be raised that if the obiigee — trying no settlement out of court — has given 
cause to action at law unnecessarily, he must bear certain disadvantageous 
consequences of the rules of procedure (e. g. costs). 
It follows from what has been said that in the sphere of warranty a 
number of fur ther rules on notification become matterless, at least as concerns 
regulation on the level of act. What becomes matterless first of all is the 
question of the singleand two-phase system, as well as several suggestions for 
the general introduction of the gross time limit. 
It is likewise unnecessary to concern ourselves on the level of act with 
formal questions connected with notification (verbal or written), and with 
questions of content (e. g. whether the cause eliciting the defect must be 
indicated in addition to the defect proper, etc.). If the solution suggested by us 
is adopted, it must be decided really on the level of interpretation by legal 
practice which the formal and content criteria of notification are in order that 
notification could be ascribed the force to interrupt prescription (see the 
pertinent maxims in Civil Law Principled Decision XXXI). 
Based on the foregoing, the principal maxims of the construction of the 
claim assertion system outlined by us are the following: 
1. The starting date for the period of claim assertion is acceptance. 
2. The general period of claim assertion is 6 months. 
3. This time limit has the nature of prescription. 
4. Suspension is possible for various reasons. The most important case is 
if no claim assertion took place until the expiry of 6 months because the defect 
manifested itself for the obligee later than 6 months. The burden of proof is 
on the obligee in that he must prove that assertion of the claim has not taken 
place earlier for a reason that is really excusable. The period of prescription 
is prolonged by 3 months counted from the cessation of the excucable reason. 
5. Notification given within the general period of warranty interrupts 
prescription, notification given later than 6 months indicates; in essence, the 
end of the situation of suspension, or the cessation of the circumstance result-
ing therein. 
6. Suspension and interruption may come about for other reasons as well. 
7. Within the period of warranty, assertion of the claim may take place 
even by filing directly action; notification is no necessary precondition thereof. 
38 
8. Relevant steps for claim assertion may be taken at any time within the 
6 months. This means that no special time limits exist within this period, not 
even in cases where it is obvious that a relatively considerable time has elapsed 
between the manifestation of the defect and the assertion of the claim. 
9. For reasons already discussed — if only for a definite exclusion of 
marginal abuses — it is necessary to determine objective time limits for the 
assertion of warranty claims. This time may be 18 months, possibly 2 years. 
Following this, claims under warranty may not be raised any more, whatever 
the circumstances be. 
39 
Felelős kiadó: dr. Kovács István 
75-2667 — Szegedi Nyomda 
